This is an episode of Reality Asserts Itself, produced on October 17, 2013. On Reality Asserts Itself with Paul Jay, historian Peter Kuznick analyzes Obamaâs claim of an enlightened US foreign policy.
PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome back to The Real News Network. Iâm Paul Jay in Baltimore. And this is Reality Asserts Itself. Weâre continuing our series of interviews with Peter Kuznick on the whole theory of American exceptionalism. Peter now joins us in the studio.
Peter is professor of history and director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University. Heâs cowriter of the ten-part Showtime series called Untold History of the United States. And thereâs now a 12-part of that series coming out, two new episodes, on a DVD and through digital download all over the place, and thatâs coming out as we speak.
Thanks for joining us again Peter.
PETER KUZNICK, PROF. HISTORY, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON: Hey, Paul.
JAY: And let me say Iâm kind of looking forward to seeing these two parts, âcause Iâm particularly interested in the one of the Philippines. As we talked in part one, we started talking about Americaâs war against the people of the Philippines, and that gets very little coverage. I mean, I would venture to say 99 percent of our audience whoâs under the age ofâwell, Iâll bet you most of our audience knows nothing about the war of the Philippines. But young people absolutely know nothing about the war in the Philippines.
KUZNICK: Well, youâre raising a sensitive point, because not your audience, but most Americans know nothing about American history. Thatâs one of our big concerns, that according to the national report card issued in June 2011, high school seniors tested lower in U.S. history than they did in math or science. The lowest of any area, the area they knew the least, was U.S. history. Twelve percent of U.S. high school seniors were judged to be proficient in American history. But even thatâs misleading, because only 2 percent could identify the issue that Brown v. Board of Education was addressing, even though the answer was obvious from the way the question was posed. So we have a real problem, first, that people donât know any history, and secondly, that most of what they know is wrong.
JAY: And let me just add one little segue, caveat to that, which is in OntarioâI grew up in Toronto, and you can get through the whole of high school with one history credit. Iâm on the advisory committee to a masters of journalism program at a university in Ontario, and you can finish your masters in journalism and have taken only one high school history credit. And now youâre supposed to go out and do journalism.
KUZNICK: My whole project with Oliver is based on the idea that history is important, that everybody has an understanding of history, and what their view of history is, no matter if itâs well articulated or not, is going to shape what theyânot only what they think of the past, but what they think of the future, what they think of future possibilities. When youâve got such a narrow, constrained, distorted view of history, you canât think, you canât imagine that you could create a future thatâs different from the present. I see that all the time with the students and with others in American society. Thereâs no utopian thought anymore. They canât envision a different society, a different way of relating, a different kind of world. And that limits their ability to act.
JAY: Right. Okay. Letâs pick up where we left off in part one. You talked about the war in the Philippines being a major shift. But before that, Americaânow, letâsâagain, the narrative is all about America the progressive, America the revolutionary, America fighting for independence, and we can never forget slavery and the genocide against native people. So the American narrative already starts with an exception to how wonderful we all are, because you could be wonderful and still have slavery, you can be wonderful and still wage genocide. That being said, America wasnât going to be the country of foreign adventures, and then it was. So talk a bit about that shift and why you think it took place.
KUZNICK: You have to put it in the context of the 1890s. And in 1893, the United States suffered its greatest depression up to that point. You have to remember the United States had cyclical depressionsâ1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, a little bit in 1883. Then the big one hit in 1893 and there was millions unemployed. People were riding the rails. They were hobos, and they were trying to sleep in police stations for the winter so that they would at least be able to keep warm and get fed. This was a terrible time. And this was a depression that endured, and it lasted. There were uprisings around the country.
But there were really two fundamental ways to get out of that. One was toâbecause it was a depression based on overproductionâAmericaâs factories, American industry was booming during that time. And so they were producing more than the American market could absorb, the way it was structured. So there were two possible alternatives to that. The progressive alternative is to raise standard of living so that people could actually buy those surplus goods.
JAY: Raise wages.
KUZNICK: Yeah, raise wages. And the other alternative was to look for markets overseas. And thatâs the view that triumphed. And if you look at the statements of the leading industrialists of the time, the Rockefellers and others, they were all talking about the fact that American production has outstripped Americaâs capacity to consume, and weâve got to find overseas markets. In addition to the markets, we wanted the cheap labor as well.
JAY: And raw materials.
KUZNICK: And raw materials, yeah. They all go together.
JAY: And thereâs nothing new about that in a sense. Thatâs what colonialization, European colonization to a large extent was about, maybe less about the problem of overproduction, but certainly finding raw materials, finding new markets.
KUZNICK: But the Americans had a different vision. We were going to accomplish everything that the Europeans had. We were going to get all the benefits of Empire without being a colonial force. That was the American idea. We saw how tied down the kind of big bureaucracies that the Europeans needed to become colonial powers. The United States never develops that in that way, or at least not till much later.
So what we have is what we call an open-door empire. Secretary of State John Hay issues these âOpen Doorâ notes, and weâre going to be able to batter down all the barriers. Weâre going to get access to the markets. We want a world of free trade in which we have access to all those people. So weâre opposed to those kind of colonial spheres that exclude the United States. And so thatâs our vision. Itâs a different vision than the Europeans had.
And we evenâif you look at Wilson versus the French and the British during World War I, Wilsonâs 14 points were predicated on the idea that there wasnât going to be this kind of colonial distribution afterwards. However, Wilson caves in time after time after time and allows them to follow through on the secret treaties that they had established before World War I, even that Lenin later exposes. But Wilson allows them to keep those deals. In exchange, he was hoping for establishing the League of Nations. The idea was that weâll create the League of Nations in order to clean up all the problems that were resulting from the agreements that we had made at Versailles.
JAY: Now, this idea that America is the city on the hill, that God gave us thisâweâre going to keep the world from chaos and thisâwe have higher ideals. But then thereâs always exceptions to that. So, in other words, I was saying to you off-camera, you know, Europe does bad things for bad reasons. America does bad things for good reasons. But on the other hand, the real practice is [crosstalk] Well, letâs go back to the Monroe Doctrine and the wholeâhow do you explain that weâre the country of justice and liberation and sovereignty and everything else, and then we say, well, except that we own Latin America, and everybody in Latin America better submit to us?
KUZNICK: Because weâre going to go there to civilize them. We going to uplift them. Weâre going to raise their standards of living. Weâre going to improve their education. And you see how much they love us now, so it mustâve worked.
But we have a lot of exceptions. The United States, like other countries, is full of contradictions. The treatment as you were saying, of Native Americans is not something that Americans are proud of. Thereâs still a big controversy of whether or not to change the Washington Redskinsâ name which is now all over the news. But Americansâ treatment of the Native Americans, the genocide against Native Americans is universally condemned now and considered shameful, at least in the last two decades. Slavery is universally condemned and considered to be shameful.
We havenât dealt with the consequences of either of those problems in any serious way, but at least if you look at Americaâs textbooks, theyâre not going to be celebrating the genocide against the Indians, theyâre not going to be celebrating the enslavement of African-Americans.
JAY: Which at the time they did.
KUZNICK: Which they did till quiteâmuch more recently. It was part of this uplifting, civilizing mission that the white men in the Northeast were going to conduct for all of humanity. And we continue to have that view in terms of our foreign involvement. Thatâs a view that still exists to a large extent. There are still historians, as you were saying, who are going to support what the United States did in the Philippines and as part of this Christianizing, uplifting mission.
It gets complicated. It gets complicated a little bit after World War I. World War I is not a popular war in its aftermath. It wasnât very popular at the time, between the gas warfare and the trench warfare. I mean, thatâs not going to be very popular. In the aftermath of World War I, the nation recoils and there is a strong antiwar sentiment [incompr.] it takes Roosevelt a long time to get the Americans to agree to go into World War II, and there was still a lot of resistance.
But then, after World War II, the United States comes out of World War II as, again, this shining knight on the white horse, and the United States is this civilizing force, and weâre fighting the good war now against communism, at least by 1948.
So World War II, although even that, because of the atomic bombing and because of what we learn about World War II, itâs hard to have that untrammeled, unvarnished sense of American greatness. But it continues through the 1950s to a large extent and through the early 1960s. And itâs really Vietnam that changes the narrative. Much like Iraq and Afghanistan are changing the narrative again, Vietnam changed the American narrative in the â60s.
JAY: Well, before we get to Vietnam, the ability of this official narrative, which is mostly total mythologyâI mean, yeah, thereâsâyou could say, you know, maybe the Belgians were more brutal in the Congo than the Americans were in Guatemala [incompr.] they didnât cut peopleâs hands off and hang them from trees and things, but certainly many of the regimes that have been supported in Latin America and around the world have been, you know, every bit as brutal as European colonialism was.
Yet thereâs still this ability to keep this narrative that Barack Obama can say what he said, and it seems perfectly reasonable. And let me just play the quote of Obama again, just to remind everybody what it was.
~~~
BARACK OBAMA, U.S. PRESIDENT: Some may disagree, but I believe America is exceptionalâin part because we have shown a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and treasure to stand up not only for our own narrow self-interests, but for the interests of all.
~~~
JAY: Itâs a narrative that still can be talked about.
KUZNICK: Yes. But Obamaâthat wasnât his position originally. During the 2008 campaign, he saysâhe was asked about it. He says, I believe in American exceptionalism as I suspect the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks in Greek exceptionalism. And he got pounced upon. Right? The neocons and the conservatives all jumped on him. McCainâ.
JAY: Yeah, let meâIâll read you a quote from Mike Huckabee about that. Huckabee says, âHisââmeaning Obamaâsââworldview is dramatically different than any president, Republican or Democrat, weâve had.â âHe grew up more as a globalist than an American.â And here is, of course, the punchline: âTo deny American exceptionalism is in essence to deny the heart and soul of this nation.â
KUZNICK: Yeah, and that was a viewâthatâs probably the strongest statement of it, but others said the same thing. And Obama learnedâin typical Obama fashion, he didnât learn the right lesson. He didnât learn that you stand up on principle and you educate the American people as to why this is a dangerous philosophy, American exceptionalism. He embraced American exceptionalism. When the troops came back from Fort Bragg, whatâObamaâs greeting to them was really troubling. Obama says to the troops coming back from Iraqâhe greeted them at Fort Bragg, and he commended their willingness to sacrifice so much for a people that you never met, which is âpart of what makes us special as Americans. Unlike the old empires, we donât make these sacrifices for territory or for resources. We do it because itâs right. There can be no fuller expression of Americaâs support for self-determination than our leaving Iraq to its people. That says something about who we are.â And then he goes on to say: â⊠the values that are written into our founding documents, and a unique willingness among nations to pay a great price for the progress of human freedom and dignity. This is who we are. Thatâs what we do as Americans,â you know, paying a unique price.
What did Alan Greenspan say? He said, of course this war is about oil. He says, why canât the Americans accept the fact? And Greenspanâs not a raving liberal. He was the former head of the Federal Reserve. But Obamaâs got to cloak it in this idea of this noble mission. Itâs very, very dangerous. Even Vietnam, if you look now, Obama has called for a 13-year reassessment and commemoration of Vietnam. As other presidents before him, he once had a critical narrative on Vietnam, but now heâs embracing Vietnam. Again, very dangerous.
Recent surveys show that 51 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds think that the Vietnam War was worth fighting and justified. This is shocking to some of us, any of us who lived through that period, to see this kind of sea change among young Americans. But you hear this kind of rhetoric, you see somebody like Obama, who they think is progressive, embracing Vietnam to a much greater extent than before, and it distorts their view of what the United States should do and can do in the world. The reality of Vietnam, as you know, was one of the worst bloodbaths in the 20th century.
JAY: Millions of people killed.
KUZNICK: Yeah. And if you ask young people how many millions were killed, they estimate between a half million and a million Vietnamese died in the war. When Robert McNamara came into my class, he told my students that he accepts that 3.8 million Vietnamese died in the war. McNamara was the architect of that war. Three-point-eight million.
I did this calculation recently. If you go down to the Vietnam War Memorial, you look at that, itâs got the names of 58,272 Americans who died in the war. The message is the tragedy of Vietnam is that 58,272 Americans died. The Okinawa war memorial, which I think is a real war memorial, has the names of all the Okinawans who died, all the Japanese, all the Americans, all the Brits, all the Australians, all the people who died. That sends a message about war. The Vietnam Memorial sends a very different message. Itâs 146 feet long. If they included the names of all the Vietnamese, all the Cambodians, all the LaotiansâI calculated recently it would be over four miles long. Could you imagine a war memorial over four miles long in the heart of Washington, D.C., and the message that that would send? I think that that would be the message that that really needs to get out there.
And to me itâs shocking, again, American historical ignorance. If you askâI ask my students, how many Jews died in the Holocaust, all the hands go up. They all know the 6 million figure. But imagine how we would feel, because they have no idea how many Vietnamese died in their own war. But the atrocities committed by their country they donât know. They know the atrocities committed by other countries.
What would we feel if the average German student thought that, letâs say, 1 million Jews died in the Holocaust? We would be appalled at the moral depredation thatâs gone on there to allow them to not understand their history in the atrocities. But the Germans do. Theyâve studied it.
The Americans donât. Maybe they know something about the Native Americans now in a general sense [incompr.] about slavery. But they donât knowâas you were saying, they donât know about the Philippines. They donât know about this narrative that weâre trying to convey, which is not just about American flag-waving and all the good things we do. Yeah, the United States does a lot of good things. But itâs about the terrible things that the United States does.
JAY: And part of that narrative is that if Assad uses chemical weapons and kills several thousand people, that is an absolutely unacceptable red line. But if the United States dropped atomic bombs and actually used the worst weapons of mass destruction on a civilian population, within this narrative it can all be justified. And, well, make this point, and then weâre going to go to the next segment.
KUZNICK: And it is justified, because right now the United States, at the Udvar-Hazy Annex of the Air and Space Museum, this national museum, is displaying the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. And instead of being critical of the era of weapons of mass destruction, General John âJackâ Dailey, the head of the aerospace museum, announced in 2003âwhen they announced this, he said, weâre going to display the Enola Gay in all of its glory as a magnificent technological achievement. We celebrate this, we celebrate the atomic bombs dropping, even though, as we show in our Untold History, in our book and our documentary series, there was no military justification, no moral justification. It wasnât necessary to end the war. And it didnât end the war. Thatâs another fallacy in the United States. It was the Soviet invasion that ended the war.
JAY: And weâd done a whole segment on this, and you should watch this whole series on Untold History, âcause itâs really good.
Alright. In the next segment of our interview, Peter and Oliver were in Japan recently, and it was on the anniversary of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombing. And in the next segment, Iâm going to ask Peter, well, what do they think of American exceptionalism?
Please join us for the continuation of our discussion on Reality Asserts Itself on The Real News Network.
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âPeter Kuznick is a professor of history and director of the award-winning Nuclear Studies Institute at American University and is currently serving his sixth three-year term as a distinguished lecturer with the Organization of American Historians. He has written extensively about science and politics, nuclear history, and Cold War culture.â

