How the Left Won Sri Lanka - Devaka Gunawardena Pt. 2/2


In part two, political economist Dr. Devaka Gunawardena outlines the political dynasties in Sri Lanka that governed the country until the National People Power’s (NPP) recent electoral victory. Gunawardena discusses how NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake has garnered widespread support across different ethnic and class lines despite being a political outsider. 

Historic Victory for Sri Lankan Left – Can They Deliver? – Devaka Gunawardena Pt. 1/2


Talia Baroncelli
You’re watching theAnalysis.news, and I’m Talia Baroncelli. This is part two of my conversation with political economist Devaka Gunawardena. We’ll be speaking about the left-wing coalition governing Sri Lanka and whether it’s actually making good on its promises to alleviate the burden of austerity on the people of Sri Lanka.

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Joining me now is Dr. Devaka Gunawardena. He is a political economist and research fellow at the Social Scientists Association in Sri Lanka. He completed his Ph.D. in Anthropology at the University of California in Los Angeles, and he recently wrote an excellent article together with Ahilan Kadirgamar called The Sri Lankan Left’s Long Road to Power. So, thank you very much for joining us today, Devaka. It’s really great to have you.

Devaka Gunawardena
Thank you very much, Talia. I’m glad to be on.

Talia Baroncelli
Dissanayake is, in a way, an outsider. He doesn’t actually represent any specific political dynasty, such as the Rajapaksa’s. Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his older brother, Mahinda, represent this very entrenched establishment or political dynasty, but Dissanayake doesn’t come from that, and yet his coalition, the NPP, was able to get votes from the North and the Northeast. The North representing the Tamil vote, and the Northeast representing the Tamil as well as the Muslim vote.

Devaka Gunawardena
Absolutely. So, many people always say Sri Lanka’s political class is primarily composed of several families: the Bandaranaike, the Wickremesinghe, and eventually, the Rajapaksa. Dissanayake doesn’t come from any of those families. I think there have been a lot of origin stories about where he came from, but my understanding is, a relatively humble, rural background, north-central part of the country called the dry zone. The difference, for example, is that there have been, technically, outsiders in Sri Lanka’s politics before. For example, there was a man named Ranasinghe Premadasa who came from a lower caste, like a poor urban area of Colombo. He became the president, and he was assassinated by the Tigers, I think in ’93 or ’94, but he was part of the United National Party.

The difference is that Dissanayake– not only is his party, they’re unrepresented. They’re not part of these two camps; he also has this humble origin. I think, again, will that alone power a change in the policymaking mindset? That I can’t speak to, but yes, definitely it does represent a rupture with these dynasties that have dominated Sri Lanka’s politics.

Talia Baroncelli
A few months before Dissanayake’s election, you wrote a really interesting article called Beyond Electoral Politics and the Left. I’m just going to quote a part from it, which I thought was really interesting, and I quote:

“The real danger, then, is not a Left that fails to seize the advantage through a full-throated endorsement of an electoral alternative to the legacy bourgeois opposition. Rather, it is a situation in which the Left has not considered the very likely dangers if such an electoral force wins and forms a government but nevertheless fails to deliver the goods. And it is in such a situation of dejection and growing resentment—when a social democratic or otherwise quasi-progressive government lacks the strength to break with economic orthodoxy—that far-right forces and other right-wing populist contenders seize the advantage. We have witnessed this trend with the recent victory of Javier Milei in Argentina. Again, like Greece, Argentina had a far more vibrant anti-austerity movement than Sri Lanka. And yet there, too, the Left found it extraordinarily difficult to push through an alternative agenda. The task must not be taken lightly.”

My question would be, can Dissanayake even deliver the goods?

Devaka Gunawardena
Yeah. The political analysis, it’s always obviously very difficult because there are so many different variables. I think when Wickremesinghe took power right after Rajapaksa was deposed in 2022– see, Ranil actually came from a different party. Technically, he wasn’t aligned with the Rajapaksas, but then it became very obvious that, as you said, because of these elite familial and other dynastic connections, they were willing to protect each other.

So, he took power, and he postponed these local government elections that were supposed to be held in 2023. Like that, I assumed this would really be the Sri Lankan phase of fascism. This will be now the authoritarian turn if he’s going to delay elections. Lo and behold, they held the elections as planned in 2024, so now this government has come in. It’s always a moving target, and I wouldn’t say necessarily that this will happen for sure. If this government fails, then this will happen.

I think you have to look at the underlying situation, which is, this is Sri Lanka’s worst economic crisis since independence. There has already been a political backlash. There has already been resistance. The sitting president was deposed. That’s unprecedented. Sri Lanka has had universal suffrage since 1931, one of the longest in Asia. It’s one of the countries with the longest history in Asia of universal suffrage. So, they have regularly changed governments through elections, but in this moment, people were so frustrated that they actually went out to the streets and, through a largely nonviolent popular uprising, threw the president out.

Now, what happens, though, if after all of that– you can just imagine what people’s expectations are? If after all of that, you elect a government, again, unprecedented, doesn’t come from the two main camps, says they’re going to deliver on these huge expectations, what if they fail? Now, the way I see it, it’s almost like a game of elimination. Eventually, you’re going to return to one or the other solution. Either it’s going to be more of the same: the establishment, austerity, orthodoxy, no deviation from that, or you get a populist. Now, in this case, right now, some are arguing that this government is “Left populist.” I think, as we’ve seen from so many other places around the world, i.e., Argentina, Greece, the U.S., wherever, when the Left or center-left, whatever it is, when it fails, it is more often than not the far-right that can take advantage.

I’m not saying that there couldn’t be an interregnum where maybe even the Rajapaksas make a comeback. They have another scion, Namal, who’s the son of Mahinda. I’m not saying that’s impossible, but more likely than not, the way I see it is it’s a demagogue who would likely capitalize on frustration if it’s not channeled in the right direction. I think there’s a real danger, and NPP has set expectations very high. They have said practically that they are promising system change, but the problem is they do not yet have the policymaking mindset to make a full break.

Again, I understand it’s a difficult situation. Look, there are no easy options. I would never say, oh, Sri Lanka can just walk away from the IMF, and there will be no consequences. There will be consequences, but the question is whether you have also mobilized the people and got them ready for a change in which you can actually try to start pursuing this alternative. I don’t think this government has done that yet. That’s a really, I think, it’s a very dangerous situation.

Talia Baroncelli
Is that because the makeup of the coalition is drawing from, as you already mentioned, the middle class and some of the upper classes, and maybe undercuts the idea of Dissanayake representing a Marxist economic policy? Is that because of the actual coalition itself and who it’s representing, or is there something else that accounts for that?

Devaka Gunawardena
Definitely, I mean, there are contradictions in this coalition for sure. As I mentioned earlier, the NPP has really tried to court the business community. They want to make it clear they’re not going to ruffle any feathers, but at the same time, they have demands from their base, from people who are suffering under austerity, to make a change. Even before the election, they were talking about creating a production economy and trying to produce more in Sri Lanka, but what does that mean? How do you actually create a production economy? You have to have state intervention. You have to have an industrial policy, but without these tools, because they’ve really tied their hands behind their back, then they can’t actually achieve any of these objectives.

A very concrete example is how they said even before the election, we’re really seriously considering renegotiating this debt sustainability analysis. It’s a very complex process, but essentially what it means is, based on this analysis, it determines the kind of haircut that creditors are willing to give Sri Lanka under this IMF-led process. There are external creditors; there are bondholders. They own about, before, I think it was up to $14 billion worth of sovereign bonds. This analysis had basically said, “Okay, on these terms, we’re expecting a very low haircut, maybe 20, 30%.” In other cases, in Argentina, I think they had a haircut of up to 70%. This is very low comparatively. As I mentioned, Sri Lanka is also just coming out of this really deep economic crisis.

Dissanayake, they were campaigning at that time, but they had said, “Look, we’re going to renegotiate this when we come in.” As soon as they came in, they folded like a house of cards. It was, like, immediate, “Okay, we’re just going to follow the deal that was signed previously because we want to ensure continuity and we want to ensure stability.” So, there’s really a lot of fear. There’s a tremendous amount of fear.

I think in that sense, too, you can’t just solely blame or focus on NPP. It’s about the international media. It’s about the entire international environment. How much pressure? I mean, all the articles that were coming out from the Financial Times, which I do read. I like to read it, but let’s face it, it was a lot of red-baiting. “Sri Lanka elects its first Marxist president.” 

Talia Baroncelli
Yeah, exactly. 

Devaka Gunawardena
There was no scrutiny of that label, no question about, okay, what coalition does he actually represent? It was just, look, this guy’s a Marxist. So, what’s the implication? If you try to renegotiate, if you try to do anything to deviate from this program, we’re going to tag you as crazy, and people are going to think you’re going to bring back fuel queues, and it’s going to look ugly. There is a tremendous amount of pressure, but the way I see it, they’re not going to have a choice, ultimately, because there are going to be so many other shocks likely to occur in the future, whether it’s a trade war, Trump’s Trade War, or a real war, God only knows. So, I think that Sri Lanka really needs to get serious about self-sufficiency, especially in essential items like food. From there, you can try and build out an alternative development plan, but we’re still waiting to see whether the NPP is really committed to that. Like you said, a lot of it will depend on how they manage these tensions in their own coalition.

Talia Baroncelli
Right, and in December, we saw that they actually did restructure this landmark sovereign debt package, so they’re on the same track as the previous administration. When we speak about some of the internal contradictions, what is the pressure on the coalition? Can you speak a bit more about maybe the makeup of different labor movements in Sri Lanka or whether they’re actually quite weak in the country and the role that they play here?

Devaka Gunawardena
Yeah, so, unfortunately, it’s a story that’s been told in many other parts of the world. The labor movement is incredibly weak. I know because I actually did my dissertation research on labor organizing in the garment sector, and it is practically non-existent. There were very strong unions during the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s, but after liberalization, J. R. Jayewardene, this man I mentioned earlier who said, “Let the robber barons come,” crushed a general strike of workers in 1980, kind of like Reagan with the Air Traffic Controller Strike. After that, the whole movement, I think, really got disorganized and was very pessimistic. They really experienced, I think, an enduring setback because of that failure.

There have been small steps to try and revive it. Again, I always respect people who try, especially union organizing; that is extremely difficult work. The reality is that Sri Lanka, especially this government, did not ride in on a very strong anti-austerity movement. Even in Argentina, even in Greece, there was at least a very explicit anti-austerity movement, but if at all, they capitalized on people’s general frustration with the political class, with the Rajapaksas, but it wasn’t necessarily channeled in an economic direction. So, a lot of people have still thought, “We can’t do anything other than the IMF. This is the only game in town. We have to continue with these austerity measures. What else to do?”

That being said, I do think Sri Lanka, of course, has a past that is very relevant and very important to remember and bring up in moments like this. In 1953, the government at the time was trying to cut a food subsidy. Again, up until the early ’80s, Sri Lanka offered a food subsidy in which each household could get, I think, a kilo of rice or something each week. Sri Lanka actually had very high human development indicators for the region compared to Bangladesh, compared to Pakistan, and India. It was more like an Indian state like Kerala or West Bengal, where one of these left-to-center governments was in power. The government tried to cut this food subsidy, and people came out onto the street. It was a massive strike, a demonstration. It was called the Great Hartal.

So, like that, I think the memory of that still exists in moments like the revolt that happened in 2022, but we’re still trying to build up an economic consciousness. We’re still trying to ask whether there’s an alternative to austerity. I think this government, it’s not just the people hemming it in. For sure, the business classes are not going to want a wealth tax. Middle-class folks who can afford it, they still want their imports, but ultimately, I think a lot of it has to do with their need to really get serious about policymaking and about an alternative. That requires deep work, deep thinking, and deep organizing. Given the state that the labor movement is in, given the state of all these other extra-parliamentary movements, I think it’s going to be challenging, but hey, they do have a two-thirds majority in parliament, so now is the time to use it. Now is the time to actually try and get something done.

Talia Baroncelli
Just one quick question before you have to go. I know you have to go in a few minutes, but the debt-for-nature movement, did that play a role at all in the campaigning of the NPP, like calling for some sort of debt relief or debt cancelation based on the climate crises in Sri Lanka and the fact that the global north has essentially shipped a lot of its emissions to the global south and shipped a lot of its manufacturing to the global south, and they’re bearing the brunt of the climate crisis so that they should also be benefiting from certain debt relief measures? 

Devaka Gunawardena
Absolutely. I think there are definitely extra-parliamentary activists who have been working on this question, and I don’t have any of the same kind of expertise. But the way I understand it, there are definitely folks who are demanding debt relief on the principle that climate change will have severe impacts on developing countries like Sri Lanka. There is also a, I want to say a counterargument from sections of the establishment who are also saying on that basis, Sri Lanka doesn’t need debt relief. It needs more climate financing or concessional financing.

I think the political logic behind climate change, we really have to unpack it. We really have to be careful because, again, different folks will appropriate those arguments in different ways. Of course, in an ideal world, there would be financing for countries like Sri Lanka, plus there would be debt relief, but I think, again, I always go back to looking at the domestic situation, the kind of redistribution that’s required in the country itself. For that, we need a wealth tax. We need other forms of redistribution. If other countries are willing to come together to work on a climate alternative, especially in this very difficult geopolitical context, then, of course, it would be great if Sri Lanka could actually participate in that, but the nature of this crisis is that, unfortunately, it’s happening now, and the solution has to also be a little more short term and immediate, even as much as we’re looking at the long term.

I think for those climate mechanisms to come into play, I think it will take a little bit– not a little bit more time, but it will take more time, more organizing work. So, for me, the question is, what can Sri Lanka do right now under these circumstances? But I think definitely there is a constituency for radical action on climate change. We’re even talking about a country where a lot of the food that’s produced is going to be affected by climate change. We need to take all of those issues very seriously. I think, again, there are other activists, other folks out there who are working on these issues in-depth, and we need to listen to them.

Talia Baroncelli
All right, Dr. Devaka Gunawardena. It’s been really great speaking to you. Thanks so much for your time. I hope next time we can speak to you about the history of agrarian resistance in Sri Lanka because that’s a really interesting topic and, again, plays into different strategies for the Left for transcending capitalism and exploitation. Hopefully, next time, we can speak about that.

Devaka Gunawardena
Absolutely, yeah. Definitely another conversation. I look forward to that. Thank you. 

Talia Baroncelli
It’s been great having you. Thank you.

Thank you for all of your support and for watching theAnalysis.news. See you next time. 


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Devaka Gunawardena is Research Fellow at the Social Scientists’ Association in Sri Lanka. He holds a PhD in Anthropology from the University of California, Los Angeles. He writes regularly for the DailyFT and Polity Magazine in Sri Lanka, in addition to publishing in regional fora such as The Wire and Economic and Political Weekly . His research interests include political economy, development economics, and social movements.

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